Persson and Savulescu argue that moral bioenhancement is not only morally permissible; in some cases, it is morally obligatory. In this article, I introduce a new reason to worry about moral enhancement. I adapt the disability concept of misfit to show how moral enhancement could cause extreme moral disempowerment to those enhanced, which would result in moral injury. I argue that any safety framework that guides the development of moral bioenhancement must be sensitive to the problem of moral misfitting. I present the best case for moral bioenhancement before turning to my own worry concerning the development of moral bioenhancement and its practical implications. Finally, I consider a series of objections and responses.
- medical ethics/bioethics
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